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Abstract
Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s,
Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings
beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF)
in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued
on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the
banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament
of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their
commitments. The government provided unlimited funding for this guarantee, stating that
the guarantee provided full protection of depositors and other creditors; it specifically stated
that the guarantee excluded equity holders, which are not creditors. The GGF never exercised
the blanket guarantee to pay depositors or creditors of a failing bank. The Finnish Parliament
replaced the facility with standing deposit insurance on December 8, 1998, with a coverage
limit of 150,000 Finnish markkaa (USD 27,000) per depositor per bank.
Keywords: banking crisis, bank resolution, blanket guarantee, Finland, Nordic Financial
Crisis

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering blanket guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
Following a period of deregulation between
1980 and 1986, Finland’s financial sector
experienced increased credit growth. In
1990, economic growth slowed to zero. The
collapse of Finnish exports to the Soviet
Union in 1991 and weak confidence in the
Finnish markka (FIM) further worsened
economic conditions (Nyberg and Vihriälä
1994).
Beginning in 1990, Finnish banks suffered
from steadily increasing loan losses and
falling earnings (Nyberg 1992, 9). In January
1992, the prime minister appointed a
working group to review the banking
situation. Based on the working group’s
recommendations,
the
government
announced a broad-based capital injection of
up to FIM 8 billion (USD 1.8 billion)3 in
March 1992 (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
In 1992, the stock of banks’ nonperforming
assets grew rapidly from FIM 42 billion to
FIM 77 billion. In April 1992, the Finnish
Parliament created the Government
Guarantee Fund (GGF) to “secure the stable
operation of deposit banks and depositors’
claims” (Government Guarantee Fund 1992,
1). Moody’s Investors Service said it was
comforted that the government had made
explicit the implicit support for depositors
that had always been in place in Finland
(Dow Jones 1992). On August 6, 1992, the
Finnish government issued a stronger
statement that the GGF would “secure the
stable functioning of the banking system
under any circumstances [emphasis added]”
(Government of Finland 1992, 1). Research
did not reveal any bank runs in Finland at the
time.

3

Per Bloomberg, USD 1 = FIM 4.49 on March 31, 1992.
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Key Terms
Purpose: To “secure the stable functioning of the
banking system under any circumstances”
(Government of Finland 1992, 1)
Launch Date(s)

Authorization: February
1993

End Date(s)

December 8, 1998

Eligible Institutions

Deposit banks and
branches of deposit-taking
foreign credit institutions.
Available sources do not
state whether the blanket
guarantee’s coverage
extended beyond the GGF’s
members

Eligible Liabilities

Full protection of
depositors and other
creditors. Equity holders
were not covered

Fees

The fund could impose a
risk-based fee of up to
0.01% of the balance sheets
of banks. Unclear what fee
the fund imposed, or if
collected fees were
earmarked for the
guarantee

Coverage

Unclear

Outcomes

The guarantee was not
used; however, the
government spent
FIM 30 billion on bank
support after the guarantee
was authorized

Notable Features

Open-ended funding and
broad political support
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But the Finnish Parliament didn’t specifically call for a blanket guarantee for banks’ liabilities
until February 1993, in a resolution attached to an act amending the GGF. The resolution
said: “Parliament requires the state to guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet their
commitments on time under all circumstances” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994, 33). The
government provided unlimited funding for the guarantee and committed to granting all
funds needed to guarantee that banks were able to fulfill their commitments. The
government said that the guarantee provided full protection of depositors and other
creditors, while excluding equity holders (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). The guarantee was
never exercised, in that no bank failure required a government payout to depositors or other
creditors. However, the GGF did directly take on the liabilities of Arsenal, a bad bank it
created after merging 41 failing savings banks into the Savings Bank of Finland. Aggregate
loan losses fell below 1% of banks’ total assets by 1995 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).
The government replaced the blanket guarantee on December 8, 1998, with a limited deposit
insurance scheme (Valori and Vesala 1998). The coverage limit of the limited deposit
insurance scheme was FIM 150,000 per depositor per bank (IMF Staff 2003).
Summary Evaluation
The Finnish blanket guarantee has not been studied extensively. A news article published
after the blanket guarantee was authorized stated that S&P viewed the parliamentary
resolution approving the guarantee as a sign that there was unanimous political support for
the government’s rescue program for the banking sector. However, S&P pointed out that the
authorization of the guarantee would not increase money available for the bank support
package (Helsingin 1993).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Finnish government announced the blanket guarantee to “secure
the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances.”
On August 6, 1992, the Finnish government issued a press release outlining its economic
policy and stated the “Government Guarantee Fund will secure the stable functioning of the
banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]” (Government of Finland 1992,
1). In February 1993, the Parliament specifically required the GGF to guarantee banks’
liabilities. Officials at the Finnish Ministry of Finance stated that the motivation was to
reassure foreign creditors of Finnish banks and avoid a major default in the banking sector
due to liquidity shortages.
2. Part of a Package: The Government Guarantee Fund administered the blanket
guarantee along with several other bank support measures, including capital
injections, provision of funding for asset management companies, and provision
of specific guarantees.
Several support measures preceded the announcement of the blanket guarantee. In
September 1991, the Bank of Finland (BoF) acquired 53% of Skopbank, a commercial bank
that acted as a central bank for the Finnish savings banks, following an acute liquidity crisis
that was caused by the bank’s large portfolio of bad assets (Nyberg 1992). In October 1991,
the BoF extended FIM 13.4 billion as overnight credit to commercial banks, mostly to
Skopbank (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). In March 1992, the government announced its
intention to inject up to FIM 8 billion of capital into Finnish banks. By December 1992,
virtually all banks had used the facility (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
The government established the GGF on April 30, 1992, “to help ensure the stability of the
banking system, and secure the claims of both domestic and foreign depositors” (Nyberg and
Vihriälä 1994, 29).4 Lastly, in June 1992, the GGF supported 41 savings banks that later
formed the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) by providing a capital injection of FIM 5.5 billion
and a guarantee of FIM 1.7 billion for the issue of subordinated loans that was later used.
Following the August 6, 1992, announcement, the GGF provided further capital injections
into Skopbank, SBF, and STS-Bank; and funding for asset management companies to manage
nonperforming assets. The GGF also provided specific guarantees to Kansallis-Osake-Pankki,
Union Bank of Finland, and the cooperative banks, which were not used (Nyberg and Vihriälä
1994).
By the end of 1992, the BoF had FIM 9.5 billion outstanding in the form of stabilization loans
to the asset management company Sponda. Appendix A provides a table detailing all bank
support measures undertaken during the crisis.
Before 1992, cooperative, commercial, and savings banks all had their own security funds that had nearly
identical provisions, but their activities differed in practice. For more information see Valori and Vesala (1998,
12).
4
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3. Legal Authority: The Finnish Parliament approved an amendment to the Act on
the Government Guarantee Fund that endorsed the blanket guarantee.
The Finnish Parliament passed the Act on the Government Guarantee Fund on April 30, 1992,
to “secure the stable operation of deposit banks and depositors’ claims” (Government
Guarantee Fund 1992, 1). On February 23, 1993, the Finnish Parliament approved an
amendment to the Act on the Government Guarantee Fund and unanimously endorsed the
blanket guarantee by stating that “Parliament requires the state to guarantee that Finnish
banks are able to meet their commitments on time under all circumstances. Whenever
necessary, Parliament shall grant sufficient appropriations and powers to be used by the
Government for meeting such commitments” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994, 33).
4. Administration: The Government Guarantee Fund administered the blanket
guarantee.
The Finnish Parliament established the GGF on April 30, 1992, and stated that the fund’s
function was “to secure the stable operation of deposit banks and depositors’ claims”
(Government Guarantee Fund 1992, 1). Before the GGF’s establishment, the BoF was solely
responsible for upholding systemic stability; its acquisition of Skopbank in 1991 was outside
the typical scope of a central bank’s responsibilities.
A BoF discussion paper stated that the GGF made extensive use of the staffs of the Bank of
Finland and the Banking Supervision Office (BSO). The administration of the GGF initially
proved to be inadequate because the fund had no full-time staff. Also, representatives from
the BoF and BSO could not act as owners of the troubled banks and perform their supervisory
duties without a conflict of interest (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
Appendix B provides a figure outlining the administrative structure of bank support
measures in Finland.
5. Governance: The supervisory board and board of directors managed the GGF.
The GGF was managed by the supervisory board and the board of directors. The supervisory
board of the fund was made up of the Parliament’s banking commissioners, and the chairman
and vice chairman of the supervisory board were the chairman and vice chairman of the
banking commissioners. The task of the supervisory board was to:
•

Elect and dismiss the members and deputy members of the executive board and to
appoint the chairman and vice chairman of the board;

•

Approve the rules of the fund;

•

Confirm the fund’s annual budget, income statement, and balance sheet;

•

Make a proposal to the Government Council on taking out a loan for the operation
of the fund;
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•

Decide on the organization of the fund’s internal audit;

•

Decide on the granting of discharge from liability to the board of directors and the
agent; and

•

Deal with other issues presented by the board of directors. (Government Guarantee
Fund 1992)

The GGF’s board of directors initially consisted of a chairman and five other members from
the Ministry of Finance, the Banking Supervision Agency, the Bank of Finland, and the banks
that belonged to the fund. The task of the board of directors was to manage the fund’s
operations. When the government authorized the blanket guarantee, it implemented an
administrative reform of the GGF by reducing the number of board members to five. Only
one member in the newly constituted board was a representative of a specific organization,
the Ministry of Finance. Although the BoF and BSO were no longer formally represented on
the board, they continued as permanent advisers (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
The Act on the Government Guarantee Fund stated that the GGF was required to follow the
Accounting Act (655/73) in its accounting and was subject to an annual audit. The auditors
were required to provide the supervisory board with a written audit report, which contained
statements on the confirmation of the income statement and balance sheet, the granting of
discharge from liability, a proposal for measures concerning the fund’s performance, and any
reminders that affected the confirmation of the income statement and balance sheet. The
GGF also published its annual reports in 1993, 1994, and 1995, providing information
regarding bank support measures (GGF 1994; GGF 1995; GGF 1996).
6. Communication: The Finnish government issued increasingly strong statements
of public support for banks, culminating in a parliamentary resolution in
February 1993 that specifically required the GGF to guarantee banks’ liabilities.
The government issued a strong statement of public support for banks on August 6, 1992.
The press release stated that the “Government Guarantee Fund will secure the stable
functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]” (Government
of Finland 1992, 1). In February 1993, the Finnish Parliament unanimously authorized a
more explicit resolution, stating: “Parliament requires the state to guarantee that Finnish
banks are able to meet their commitments on time under all circumstances. Whenever
necessary, Parliament shall grant sufficient appropriations and powers to be used by the
Government for meeting such commitments" (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994, 33).
Officials at the Finnish Ministry of Finance also stated that there was some informal
communication regarding the blanket guarantee between the Swedish and Finnish central
banks.
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7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The government provided unlimited funding for
the guarantee.
The amendment to the Act on the Government Guarantee Fund that the Parliament passed
in February 1993 stated that the Finnish Parliament committed to granting all funds that
might be needed to guarantee that banks could fulfill their commitments (Nyberg and
Vihriälä 1994).
8. Eligible Institutions: Members of the GGF were eligible for the guarantee and
included deposit banks and branches of foreign credit institutions that received
deposits from the public.
The GGF’s members were deposit banks and branches of foreign credit institutions that
received deposits from the public (Government Guarantee Fund 1992). It is not clear
whether the blanket guarantee’s coverage extended beyond the GGF’s members.
9. Eligible Liabilities: The guarantee provided full protection of depositors and other
creditors.
The blanket guarantee provided full protection of depositors and other creditors. It is
unclear which creditors were excluded from the guarantee, if any. The government
specifically said that the guarantee did not cover equity holders, which are not creditors.
10. Fees: The GGF charged an annual fee of not more than 0.01% of the total sum of
the most recently confirmed balance sheets of the banks.
The act that established the GGF in April 1992 stated that banks in the fund must pay an
annual fee, which would be not more than 0.01% of the total sum of the most recently
confirmed balance sheets of the banks. The fund’s board was charged with determining the
amount of each bank’s annual fee based on the risks the bank had taken in its operations. It
is unclear who was in charge of determining the annual fee, the supervisory board or the
board of directors. The act stated that the fund’s calculation basis must be the same for all
banks belonging to the fund (Government Guarantee Fund 1992). Available sources did not
specify the level of the fee that the fund’s board decided to impose on banks. It is also unclear
if the GGF earmarked these fees for a specific purpose.
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The process associated with exercising the
guarantee is not clear.
Research did not reveal the process for exercising the guarantee.
12. Other Restrictions: The blanket guarantee did not impose specific restrictions.
It does not appear that the blanket guarantee imposed specific restrictions. The broad-based
capital injection in March 1992 required banks to be flexible toward borrowers having
trouble servicing their debt and meet borrowers’ needs for new loans. Restrictions
associated with other forms of bank support included: management replacement,
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restructuring, balance sheet and cost reductions, and the previous owners of the savings
banks’ losing almost all of their capital (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).
13. Duration: The Finnish Parliament required the government to guarantee bank
liabilities in February 1993 and replaced this guarantee with a limited deposit
insurance system on December 8, 1998.
In the government’s statement on August 6, 1992, it did not identify an end date of
government support for banks. However, the government said it would revise deposit
protection after European Commission (EC) legislation on deposit insurance was approved
and the Finnish banks’ financial conditions had stabilized (Government of Finland 1992).
The EC legislation on deposit insurance was approved on May 30, 1994 (EC 1994). On
December 8, 1998, a limited deposit insurance scheme with a coverage limit of FIM
150,000per depositor per bank replaced the blanket guarantee (Garcia 2000; IMF Staff 2003;
Valori and Vesala 1998).
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Appendixes
Appendix A
Figure 1: Overview of Bank Support Measures Taken by Finland, 1991–1993

Calculations do not include revenues from the sale of banks or assets during the period 1991–1996.
Source: Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010.
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Appendix B
Figure 2: Overview of Bank Support Administration in Finland, 1991–1993

Source: Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994.
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